Axis of Evil

Time for maximum pressure on North Korea, even with China’s sabotage

By Josh Rogin

North Korean soldiers salute at Mansudae hill in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Sept. 9. 

The time has come for the United States to acknowledge that its policy of trying to induce North Korea’s friends to rein in Pyongyang has failed. 

The best option for stopping the mounting nuclear threat from Kim Jong Un’s regime is to muster maximum pressure without waiting for approval or cooperation from Beijing and Moscow.
As early as Monday, the U.N. Security Council could consider a new resolution put forth by the Trump administration that proposes cutting off North Korea’s energy imports, textile exports and ability to deploy workers abroad, according to a leaked draft. 

If put to a vote, that resolution will likely fail in the face of Russian and Chinese resistance.
Should that happen, there will be no more excuse for the United States not to move forward with allies Japan and South Korea with crippling sanctions aimed at the regime, its institutions and its elite supporters. 

Until now, the administration has held back as it sought to persuade and prod Beijing to use its considerable leverage to bring Kim to heel.
Once the Trump administration acknowledges that China and Russia have done all they intend to, the United States can go much further unilaterally, or with allies, to finally test whether drastic sanctions, combined with tough diplomacy, can move Kim from his defiant position.
“The amount of pressure North Korea has been put under economically is still far short of what we applied to Iran or even Iraq,” a senior administration official said. 

“There is a long way to go before North Korea is going to feel the pressure they would need to feel to change their calculus.”
But time is running out as North Korea speeds up work on its nuclear program. 

That’s why Congress and parts of the North Korea expert community are ramping up calls for the Trump administration to pivot from using only those tools approved by China and Russia.
“I’ve watched the calibrated strategy which is enunciated by the administration and it doesn’t work,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.) told me. 

“I believe we have to come in full throttle with cutting off institutions, primarily financial institutions domiciled in China.”
The Trump administration has dabbled in imposing sanctions on Chinese entities that help enable the Kim regime’s illicit activities, but it has yet to cross the line into any area that might put delicate U.S.-China coordination at risk. 

Royce urged Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to put such measures into action during a briefing last week.
His committee also wrote a letter to the administration listing large Chinese entities ripe for sanctions, including the Chinese Agricultural Bank and the China Merchant Bank.

Chinese funders of North Korea’s nuclear program

“We have not had the resolve to put these sanctions on those major institutions,” said Royce. 

“It’s time to go to maximum pressure.”
There are risks in confronting large Chinese banks, which are essentially arms of the Chinese government. 

Former top Treasury Department official Adam Szubin testified to the Senate Banking Committee last week that imposing sanctions on the banks could harm the Chinese economy.
Nevertheless, he said, the United States should move forward: “The only hope we have lies in a qualitatively different and more severe level of pressure — one that threatens Kim Jong Un’s hold on power,” Szubin testified.
Cutting off hard currency to the Kim regime could undermine Kim’s fragile position with the North Korean elites and military leaders whom he needs to keep happy. 

Moreover, Kim needs hard currency to continue to develop his nuclear and missile programs, which rely heavily on smuggled components from other countries.
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley said last week that even if Kim doesn’t change course, crippling sanctions could slow his progress toward achieving the capability to threaten the United States.
“Do we think more sanctions are going to work on North Korea? Not necessarily,” she said at the American Enterprise Institute. 

“But what does it do? It cuts off the revenue that allows them to build ballistic missiles.”
Going after the regime’s funding proved effective in 2005, when the Bush administration sanctioned a Macau bank laundering money for the Kim family. 

That led to a series of events that brought North Korea to the negotiating table. 

Trump said recently that talking to the North Korean regime would not be productive, but his State Department is working toward direct diplomacy.
Whether the goal is to negotiate, undermine the regime’s legitimacy or simply slow its nuclear progress, moving forward without China and Russia on maximum pressure is the right move. 

It may also be the last chance to avoid a binary choice between a nuclear North Korea that can blackmail the world or war.

Trump's Mongolism Syndrome

Taiwan arms deal in limbo as Trump courts China
By Josh Rogin 

For almost four decades, the United States has upheld its commitment to help Taiwan provide for its own self-defense against China — but the Trump administration has yet to affirm it. 

As a planned arms-sales package lingers in limbo, officials, lawmakers and experts worry that Trump may be granting yet another unreciprocated concession to Beijing.
The relatively small sale to Taiwan — worth just more than $1 billion — was set to go in late 2016, but the Obama administration never pulled the trigger. 

After some early pro-Taiwan signals from Trump, including a phone call with its president, most Taiwan watchers expected the new administration to move the package forward quickly. 

Now, administration and congressional officials say, the deal is stalled due to a lack of administration consensus and the fear that angering Beijing could complicate Trump’s top Asia priority: solving the North Korean crisis.
Those inside the government and on Capitol Hill say the administration risks giving in to China on one of its top priorities in exchange for nothing concrete, while putting the safety of the island democracy in increased danger.
“I think it’s important we keep our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and under Ronald Reagan’s ‘Six Assurances,’ ” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Edward R. Royce (R-Calif.) told me. 

“This helps keep the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
The 1979 law to which Royce referred states that U.S. policy will be to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” and Reagan’s 1982 “assurances” made clear that there was no end date for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and that the United States is not required to consult with Beijing on the issue. 

These two documents have been the bedrock of bipartisan U.S. strategy on Taiwan ever since.
Following the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping last month, many expected the administration to quickly approve the still-pending package and notify Congress. 

Now, administration and congressional officials say the White House has not provided clear policy direction to the national-security agencies or Congress, causing significant confusion.
Adding to those concerns were the president’s comments last month that he would consult with Xi before speaking again with the Taiwanese president. 

Trump said he would not want to be “causing difficulty” for Xi while seeking his help with North Korea.
One possibility is that the administration is preparing to bundle the limited Obama Taiwan arms package with more robust weapons. 

The Taiwanese government is expressing interest, for example, in acquiring the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

But doing so might complicate the surrounding diplomacy even more and cause further delays.
Some U.S. officials want Trump to move forward with the smaller arms package now, to establish that the United States is still committed to aiding Taiwan’s defenses in the Trump era. 

Many are advocating for a return to a more regular process whereby requests are considered and sales notified on an annual basis.
“This is the only way to avoid the speed bumps of the U.S.-China relationship stalling arms packages for years on end,” one U.S. defense official said. 

The State Department said it does not comment on pending arms sales. 

The White House did not respond to requests for comment.
No matter which route the Trump administration takes, congressional support is assured. 

“I will strongly support any arms package the Trump administration will put forward for our friend and ally, Taiwan,” said Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.), who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on East Asia.
Gardner was one of seven senators who visited Taiwan last year and pressed President Tsai Ing-wen to increase Taiwan’s own defense spending to 3 percent of its gross domestic product. 

Lawmakers worry that U.S. calls for Taiwan to spend more on defense will ring hollow if Washington won’t sell Taiwan the defense items it needs.
Even if Tsai reaches her goal, Taiwan cannot keep pace with Beijing. 

Taiwan will spend about $11.6 billion on defense this year, compared with $146 billion spent by the Chinese government, according to official figures. 

The Pentagon’s 2016 report on China’s military states that the nation’s “primary emphasis” is to develop capabilities for a potential conflict with Taiwan.
China must be reminded that it cannot push the United States away from its commitments to partners in the region with vague promises of help on North Korea that may never come. 

If China really does believe that helping to solve that crisis is in its interest, no Taiwan arms package will change that.
The Trump administration must resist the temptation to sacrifice long-term objectives for short-term aspirations. 

There will always be some imperative with Beijing that seems more urgent. 

But as Reagan well understood, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense is too important to deal away.